Diablo Canyon Nuclear power plant is just 10km from the active offshore Hosgri Fault Zone.

Diablo Canyon Nuclear power plant is just 10km or so, if that, from the active offshore Hosgri Fault Zone. The last major earthquake on or near this fault was as recently as 1927, and a powerful probable 7.1 - 7.3. It "produced a sea-quake (compressional shock transmitted by water) and a seismic sea wave". 'Diablo' means 'Devil' in Spanish, such an apt name for a Nuclear power plant.

http://www.data.scec.org/faults/nwfault.html#MAP
http://www.data.scec.org/fault_index/hosgri.html
"Hosgri Fault Zone:
TYPE OF FAULT: primarily reverse and thrust, with some right-lateral slip
LENGTH: at least 140 km; complex zone of interlaced and parallel fault segments
NEAREST COMMUNITIES: San Simeon, Cambria, Morro Bay, Surf
LAST MAJOR RUPTURE: November 4, 1927, ML7.3 (?)
MOST RECENT SURFACE RUPTURE: Holocene, in part; otherwise Quaternary
SLIP RATE: unknown
INTERVAL BETWEEN MAJOR RUPTURES: unknown
PROBABLE MAGNITUDES: MW6.5 - 7.5
OTHER NOTES: Faults dip to the northeast. This zone is entirely offshore, with the possible exception of the San Simeon fault, which spans the 18 km between San Simeon and Ragged Point (northwest of the region covered on this map). The earthquake of 1927 is poorly located and may not have occurred on the Hosgri fault zone. "

http://www.data.scec.org/chrono_index/lompoc.html

"TIME November 4, 1927 / 5:49 am, PST
LOCATION 33° 43' N, 120° 46' W in the Lompoc area, about 16 km (10 miles) offshore
MAGNITUDE ML 7.1
TYPE OF FAULTING uncertain
FAULT INVOLVED: uncertain; possibly the Hosgri Fault
The earthquake of November 4, 1927 was one of the most powerful shocks in southern California this century. Fortunately, it occurred in a reasonably spasely populated area, and some distance offshore, so damage was lighter than would be expected for a quake of such magnitude. In the area nearest the epicenter (the coastal area near the town of Surf), people were thrown from standing and reclining positions, a concrete highway was cracked, a railroad bridge was thrown out of line, and sand and water were fountained from the ground, leaving behind up to twenty "sand craters".??This earthquake also produced a sea-quake (compressional shock transmitted by water) and a seismic sea wave. The sea-quake was so violent it killed and stunned fish near Point Arguello and shook at least two ships in the area: the S.S. Socony and the Alaska Standard. Neither was seriously damaged, however.??The seismic sea wave (tsunami) produced by the shock was approximately 2 meters high at Surf and Pismo Beach and was recorded from La Jolla (near San Diego) to Fort Point (near San Francisco). The first wave was recorded as positive (not preceded by recession of water) at all the California coastal stations that noted it.?...?"

For USA Earthquakes in general see:

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/states/seismicity/

Why on earth would anyone locate a Nuclear power plant in California on the coast after seeing a map like this?

Tsunamis do not occur in US

Tsunamis do not occur in US though.

LOL

Great Joke!

Hope you're joking.

TTFN

Diablo Canyon

It "produced a sea-quake (compressional shock transmitted by water) and a seismic sea wave". 'Diablo' means 'Devil' in Spanish, such an apt name for a Nuclear power plant.
==============================

Diablo Canyon also sits on a coastal bluff; about 85 feet above the water. The wave that hit Fukushima was about 40 feet high; so Diablo Canyon could have withstood that wave and one that was twice as high.

Look at Diablo Canyon with Google Earth. Immediately to the northeast of the plant, you will see two large pools of water. These two pools contain backup cooling water and sit on a hill above the plant. Therefore, no power to run cooling pumps is required; the water in the pools can flow by gravity to cool the reactors.

Additionally, unlike Fukushima; the backup diesel electric generators are in water-tight vaults, and the fuel tanks for Diablo Canyon are buried in the ground like those at your local gas station, instead of sitting on top of the ground next to the ship dock as was the case at Fukushima.

Uh

The claim that Diablo Canyon or any NPP could keep its cooling systems operating, with the massive and sustained sea level changes that occur in a major tsunami, you're either ignorant or delusional. By all credible (by credible I mean independent studies unrelated to PG&E, DOE et al) accounts it would fare only slightly better than San Onofre, which sits directly on the beach and would be swept cleanly off its foundations in a tsunami just a few meters high. Diablo would overheat and fail within minutes after, a repeat of this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kjx-JlwYtyE

Direct damage isn't the issue, it's surrounding damage, destruction of cooling systems and other supporting infrastructure etc. Any NPP on or near an ocean coast is a catastophe waiting to happen. If Japan didn't prove it to you nothing else could.

WRONG!!! according to independent scientific reports...

First, the earthquake that struck Fukushima was not a "100 year" quake; it was more like a "1000 year" quake. The plate faults at the western end of the Pacific ocean are subduction "thrust" faults - the type that give rise to the worst tsunamis. The "slip faults" on the eastern edge of the Pacific plate don't produce as strong a tsunami.

In any case, the March 2011 Japanese quake produced a tsunami with peak water heights of about 40 feet. Clearly, since Diablo Canyon sits on an 85 foot bluff above the Pacific; it would be untouched by a tsunami of such height.

As far as the damage to the supporting infrastructure; evidently you didn't take my advice and look at the Diablo Canyon plant via Google Earth. Diablo Canyon has coolant pools which can gravity feed to the reactors via underground plumbing. Additionally, the backup diesel generators are in watertight vaults as per mandate from the NRC.

Japan only proved that it is a catastrophe if you do things BADLY; like locating the diesel fuel tanks at dockside above ground where they are sitting ducks for a tsunami. In the USA, those tanks have to be buried.

The Japanese experience "proved" nothing.

The source of this information is independent scientific analysis of the National Academy of Science and Engineering.

Earthquakes damage

Earthquakes damage underground piping.

The very same earthquake that cause an emergency need for the reservoir water could have damaged the pipes that lead from the reservoir, a common-mode failure.

I have always wondered why

I have always wondered why they do not build these way in the ocean. It sure sounds a lot more safe than a facility in the middle of a populated area.

Kevin

It was considered

A line of offshore nuclear reactors, creating hydrogen fuel, was considered in 1973. This was in response to the Arab Oil Embargo. Some proposals included the Great Lakes.

It was considered, and darn near implemented. Consumer fuel safety was one of many concerns.

TTFN

Dumb, stupid nuke sites need

Dumb, stupid nuke sites need to endure quakes 5000 years from now.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1113/ML11133A310.pdf

Some NRC issues with Diablo Canyon in 2011:

"Notification 50373903: Portable long term cooling Pump 0-1 would not function when
tested; and
Notification 50383106: The licensee was unable to place the necessary temporary
hoses from raw water reservoir to the plant due to obstructions created by recent
security modifications.

The inspectors identified that the licensee did not have the ability to implement
Procedure OP D-1:V, “Auxiliary Feedwater System Alternate Auxiliary Feedwater
Supplies,” Revision 21, on both units simultaneously to support mitigation of a postulated
earthquake. Procedure OP D-1:V uses the diesel-driven long term cooling pump to
provide inventory from the raw water storage tank to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater
system. The inspectors identified that the procedure and staged equipment only supported
make up to one of the Diablo Canyon units.

The inspectors found that in the development of extreme damage mitigation guidelines
Procedure EDG-12, “Start Diesel Generator Without DC Power,” Revision 0A, the licensee
had not considered factors that could limit the effectiveness of the procedure following on
extended station blackout event. , including the need for a greater volume of starting air
required to start the diesel engines without generator field flash, the potential for longer
starting cranking times due to the increase in lube oil viscosity following the loss of
preheating, and the need to overcome diesel generator starting air receiver leakage which
would be inadequate to start the diesel generator after ten hours if actual leakage occurred
at the maximum rate of the design acceptance criteria.

The licensee had a contractual arrangement with a third party to supply an alternate
seawater source for cooling the component cooling water heat exchanger following a B.5.b
event. However, contractor would use the state highway system to transport the
equipment to the site following a beyond design basis event. The state highway system
and plant access roads may not be available following a beyond design basis event.

The inspectors noted that the licensee had installed a sixth diesel generator in 1992 to
comply with the alternate ac requirements of the station blackout rule. However the station
blackout diesel generator was the same design and located in the same general location
as the other five standby diesel generators. All six of the diesel generators were air cooled
and open to the 85-foot plant elevation. The inspectors concluded the alternate ac and
other standby diesel generators could be susceptible to a common made failure because
of the similarities in design and location.

Notification SAPN 50389333: Following an earthquake the check valves in the diesel
fuel oil vault could fail which could lead to flooding in the vault; and

Notification SAPN 50389414: Although the plant drain system is not credited for flood
mitigation, it is an available feature. A walkdown of the plant drains (excluding those in
high radiation areas) identified three drains that were partially blocked and three drains
with welded covers.

The inspectors identified that the beyond design basis mitigation for loss of the station
ultimate heat sink pumps included a replacement pump to provide seawater to the
component cooling heat exchangers by a commercial contractor. However, the inspectors
concluded that the contractor may not be capable of transporting the equipment to the site
following an earthquake and tsunami."

Diablo

interesting comparaison with Fukushima ...

 

diablo 3 gold

And malefic symbolism of "Diablo" in spanish : that's right

Very interesting... Thank

Very interesting...
Thank you for sharing it to us.