IAEA data on tepco provided pictures of unit 3 spent fuel pool/ see pictures

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/statusreport270412.pdf
IAEA review and assessment of the footage and images provided by TEPCO of the inside of the Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool
With the discovery by TEPCO of part of the fuel exchange machine weighing approximately 35 tons having fallen into the Spent Fuel Pool and on top of some the storage racks, the IAEA has provided some additional information based on our assessment of the images and video footage released by TEPCO.
Our assessment team has reviewed the latest videos and photos from the TEPCO underwater survey of the Unit 3 spent fuel pool. From our review, we can make the following observations:
1. The videos and photos don’t provide conclusive information on the integrity and stability of fuel assemblies, and racks. Additionally, there is no footage that provides a view of the general pool structure;
2. The pool appears to contain a lot of light gauge metal (likely roofing or siding) and some heavier-gauge material, which may be structural material from the building;
3. The pool contains quite a bit of concrete rubble, on the fuel assembly locations. Given the areal density of the rubble and if the photos and videos are representative of the over-all picture, we would expect most, if not all, of the rack positions to contain some rubble;
4. An additional photo (Figure 1) suggests that the rebar visible in the videos could have come from some large concrete structural members;
5. From the videos, photos and an additional photo (Figure 2), the refuelling crane (referred to as a “fuel exchange machine”) appears to include some extremely heavy components under the water. It appears that this machine has lost its original position and may be leaning on fuel racks. While there was no visible catastrophic damage to the racks, they may have been deformed as a result. It is also not known if the rack sites impacted by the refuelling crane contain spent fuel which could be subject to deformation;
6. We expect that the debris (rubble, etc.) in the storage racks would cause substantial problems for any subsequent defueling operation (sticking or jamming the assemblies when they are lifted). This could lead to significant damage compromising the fuel integrity if proper care is not taken and will likely severely complicate the de-fuelling operation. Maintaining pool clarity during de-fuelling operation will also be a challenge;
7. There is also the very real possibility that the fuelling machine has caused deformation to the rack (or the fuel assemblies within) to make de-fuelling even more challenging
8. The first step to any de-fuelling operation would the removal of all substantial debris from the top of the fuel racks, including the heavy components;
9. From the videos we would expect fuel damage from the material that has fallen into the pool. At least from the fuelling machine, and probably the building structural material;
10. An analysis of the cesium isotopic data to November 2011 does not yield evidence of any large failure of stored spent fuel; and
11. It is impossible to determine the state of corrosion due to salt water from these videos and photos.
In addition to the comments provided our assessment team has assembled a collection of Figures that may be useful. Figure 1 is a photo of the building showing where large pieces of concrete and a rebar could have come from. Figure 2 shows the refuelling crane before the explosion and the specific piece that is seen in the pool has been circled. Figure 3 shows that same piece in the pool as discovered by TEPCO. Figure 4 shows an underwater image of the fuel racks after the explosion and Figure 5 shows the fuel racks with the lifting handles visible.
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/statusreport270412.pdf