COLLOQUIUM
Monday, February 7, 2005
"Proliferation Rings – An Update on New Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime and Potential Responses"
Presented By
Science Fellow
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
The concept of the interlinked WMD Proliferation Rings, or the ‘Illicit Trafficking Rings’ has its impetus in the recent events related to the DPRK’s admission of its illicit Uranium enrichment program, based on enrichment technology obtained from Pakistan. This was followed by further details about missile technology exchanges between the DPRK and Pakistan and Iran, the Pakistani A.Q. Khan’s network of clandestine technology smuggling ring concentrating on uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons design, the admission of Libya to a comprehensive WMD program, as well as the potential WMD technologies transfer to other countries. This information, further described in detail in this presentation has led to the notion that the different proliferating rings specializing in missiles production, uranium enrichment, and potentially biological weapons are, in fact, interlinked – which makes their existence even more dangerous. I describe in this presentation each trafficking ring and address their interlinkage, the synergism problems it creates, and the implications of this evolution to the WMD control regimes. The impacts of the rising global oil prices and the increased supply of well trained retired nuclear scientists, some imbuded with radical religious ideology, on the evolution of the Proliferation Rings are discussed. I then describe my concept of Energy Security Initiative (ESI) which stresses BOTH security and energy guarantees. ESI, when coupled with a global effective export control regime based on the implementation of Unite Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, and with comprehensive implementation of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements, could offer a multi-pronged and meaningful nonproliferation regime.
Coffee and Cookies 3:45 PM - Colloquium 4 - 5 PM
3105 Etcheverry Hall
Bio-Sketch
Chaim Braun has thirty years of management and consulting experience in the electric and nuclear power industry emphasizing domestic and international power plant economics, and international nuclear non-proliferation issues, particularly related to the U.S., East Asia and Eastern Europe. Chaim Braun is currently a Science Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), at Stanford University. In CISAC, Chaim conducts studies related to nuclear proliferation spread, programs to provide incentives for reducing the demand for weapons, and nuclear power economics under deregulation. Previously, Chaim has worked as member of Bechtel Power Corporation’s Nuclear Business Line management group, specializing in nuclear operating and maintenance initiatives and international nuclear power plant projects. Prior to that Chaim worked as the Director of Advanced Energy Technologies in United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C) Corporation, and as Technical Manager in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Energy Study Center. He has managed domestic and international power plant economic studies for the first two presidents of EPRI. He has received his education in Chemical and Nuclear Engineering, Nuclear Chemistry and in Operations Research in the Technion and in the Weizmann Institute in Israel, and in Cornell University.
